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Abstract  The author of Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus advanced the picture 
theory of language .Early   Wittgenstein accepts Russell‟s distinction between 
compound and simple propositions. The simple or the simplest propositions derived 
from the complex propositions are ultimate propositions or unanalyzable 
propositions. They are atomic propositions which refused to be further simplified. 
Such atomic propositions are logical pictures of atomic facts which comprised the 
world outside the language. This picturisability of atomic facts by atomic 
propositions imparts meaningful atomic propositions. Every atomic proposition is 
meaningful in so far as it works out a logical picture of a corresponding atomic fact.  
 For Early Wittgenstein, only tautologies, contradictions and empirical statements 
can be meaningful. The non- tautologies, non- contradictory and non- empirical 
propositions such as metaphysical, ethical, mystical, theological, ideological, 
religious propositions can be neither true nor false but meaningless and non-sense. 
While a false statement can be meaningful, a meaningless proposition   can be 
neither true nor false and thus never a component of our stock of knowledge. 
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Early Wittgenstein‟s search for meaning has 
had a powerful impact on truthfulness of 
various types of propositions constituting 
the non-logico mathematical and non-
empirical discourse. According to early 
Wittgenstein, there are three types of 
meaningful statements: Tautologies, 
contradictions and empirical statements. 
The tautologies such as „All triangles have 
three angles‟, „All bodies are extended‟, „All 
Bachelors are unmarried‟ etc. are 
meaningful and true under all conditions. 
They are true by definition. They are 
analytic apriori because their predicate 
terms are already contained in their subject 
terms. They are tautologous because they 
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are true under all conditions. On the other 
hand, such propositions as „The teacher 
drew a round square on a black-board‟, „He 
is the son of a barren woman‟, „That triangle 
has four angles‟ etc. are contradictions. 
Now, tautologies and contradictions are not 
part of human knowledge for tautologies are 
self-confirmatory, whereas contradictions 
are self-contradictory. We have not to go in 
for any methodical, technical, data-based or 
empirical research with a view to certifying 
tautologies or contradictions. It is the 
countless empirical propositions which are 
neither self-certifying nor self-contradictory 
and are or can be true or false under given 
conditions, which comprise or constitute 
human stock of knowledge. 
 According to early Wittgenstein‟s 
account of knowledge, propositions or 
utterances which are neither tautologies nor 
contradictions nor empirical statements, are 
at the very outset outside the pale of 
meaningfulness and therefore of knowledge. 
The non-tautologous, non-contradictory and 
non-empirical propositions can be of diverse 
types. Such propositions can be 
metaphysical, mystical, theological, ethical, 
ideological, religious or axiological – such 
propositions cannot be categorized either as 
true or false. In point of fact, they cannot 
even be deemed to be meaningful or 
significant propositions. They are neither 
true nor false nor meaningful but simply 
meaningless and non-sensical propositions. 
The true or false propositions have got to be 
empirical propositions. Only empirical 
propositions can be confirmed to be either 
true or false. Only statements of science 
qualify as empirical propositions. And only 
such propositions can have significance, of 
course, by recourse to observation, 
experimentation or other necessary and 
relevant procedural strategies. The 
metaphysical philosophical and axiological 
propositions, according to early 
Wittgenstein are condemned to be 
cognitively insignificant and meaningless 
propositions. The question of the truth or 
falsity of such propositions does not arise at 
all. For, in order to count to be either true or 
false, a proposition has got to be 
meaningful. Meaningfulness is a necessary 
condition of the truth of a proposition. A 
meaningless proposition cannot be even 
false not to speak of its being true. 
 Wittgenstein in his Tractarian phase 
worked out what is famously known as 
picture theory of language. Early 
Wittgenstein is deeply impacted by 
Russell‟s logical atomism. He advances an 
all the more sophisticated version of 
Russell‟s atomistic doctrine. Early 
Wittgenstein accepts Russell‟s distinction 
between compound and simple propositions. 
The simple or the simplest propositions are 
derived from complex or compound 
propositions. The simplest propositions are 
ultimate propositions or unanalyzable 
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propositions or irreducible propositions. 
They are atomic propositions which just 
refuse to be further reduced or simplified. 
Such atomic propositions are logical 
pictures of atomic facts which comprise the 
world outside language. The atomic 
propositions picturise or mirroriseatomic 
facts. Or, we can say atomic facts are 
photographically represented by atomic 
propositions. This picturisibility of atomic 
facts by atomic propositions is the basic 
condition imparting meaning to atomic 
propositions. Every atomic proposition is 
meaningful in so far as it works out a logical 
picture of a corresponding atomic fact. In 
this way, the atomic propositions become 
directly meaningful. The compound or 
complex propositions out of which atomic 
propositions are derived, to begin 
with,cannot be directly testified to be 
meaningful. They can be said to be 
indirectly meaningful in so for as a given set 
of atomic propositions derivable from a 
given compound proposition are directly 
certified to be meaningful propositions. 
 Metaphysical, theological, 
axiological and other such propositions are 
beyond the pale of atomistic analysis. It is 
so because, we just cannot have atomic 
propositions derivable from compound 
metaphysical, theological and axiological 
statements. In view of the fact that 
theological, metaphysical and axiological 
propositions cannot operate within the 
paradigm of atomistic analysis, Wittgenstein 
deems such propositions squarely to be 
neither true nor false but simply 
meaningless and nonsense. 
 Wittgenstein‟s theory of 
propositions in the Tractatus has far 
reaching and important consequences. All 
propositions, according to that view, are 
truth-functions of elementary propositions. 
It follows that there are only three kinds of 
propositions: (1) tautologies, those whose 
truth-tables assign them truth-values of truth 
only, (2) descriptive propositions, those 
whose truth-tables assign them truth-values 
of both truth and falsity, and (3) 
contradictions, those whose truth-tables 
assign them truth-values of falsity only. 
Since tautologies and contradictions “say 
nothing”, the only kind of propositions that 
say anything are descriptive propositions. 
And all that a descriptive proposition can 
say, in the end, is that certain states of 
affairs exist or do not exist, or that certain 
“truth-functional” combinations of them 
exist or do not exist. This, then, is all that 
can be said. All intelligible discourse is thus 
limited to assertions about states of affairs 
(Pitcher, 1964, p. 139). 
 According to early Wittgenstein, any 
thought can, in principle, be put into words. 
There cannot be a thought which cannot 
possibly be put into words or we cannot 
have a thought which it is impossible in 
principle to put into words. Thus 
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Wittgenstein limits significant discourse to 
statements of natural science. It is empirical 
or descriptive propositions which assert the 
existence and non-existence of states of 
affairs. Descriptive or empirical 
propositions can be physical object 
statements as well. However, it is the 
propositions of natural science which can be 
said to be constituting the hard-core of true 
propositions. The following propositions 
from the Tractatus bring out the same: 
Propositions represent the existence and 
non-existence of states of 
affairs.(T.4.1) 
The totality of true propositions is the whole 
of natural science (or the whole 
corpus of the natural 
sciences).(T.4.11) 
Descriptive propositions, as a matter of fact, 
constitute the entire body of what can be 
significantly said. The tautologies and 
contradictions can say nothing. It is the 
propositions of natural sciences which assert 
all that can be said: 
The correct method in 
philosophy would really 
be the following: to say 
nothing except what can 
be said, i.e. propositions 
of natural science – i.e. 
something that has 
nothing to do with 
philosophy – and then, 
whenever someone else 
wanted to say something 
metaphysical, to 
demonstrate to him that 
he had failed to give a 
meaning to certain signs 
in his propositions. 
Although it would not be 
satisfying to the other 
person – he would not 
have the feeling that we 
were teaching him 
philosophy – this method 
would be the only strictly 
correct one (T.6.53) 
The early Wittgenstein as represented by 
Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, is not 
carrying out any epistemological 
investigations. He is not forwarding any 
epistemological theory. He is not defending 
rationalism, empiricism or intuitionism like 
Descartes, Locke or Bergson. He is not 
finding truth, belief and justification 
conditions of knowledge to be insufficient 
to the purpose and recommending 
indefeasibility condition like Gettier, with a 
view to arriving at indubitable knowledge 
claims. He was not an advocate of 
skepticism like Hume and advancing a 
critique of causality, induction or law of 
uniformity of nature. He is not defending 
religious beliefs and values by recourse to 
mystical, intuitive or revelatory experience.  
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 He is rather carrying out logical and 
methodological investigations of 
philosophy. He is evaluating the 
meaningfulness or meaninglessness of 
propositions or statements under 
consideration with a view to demarcating 
the sphere of sayability from the sphere of 
unsayability. He is trying to figure out what 
can be meaningfully asserted and what can 
be meaninglessly blurted out. 
 Now, the quest for such 
methodological clarification or logical 
investigation can be multidimensionally 
impactful. It can horizontally impact 
multiple spheres of human discourse. It 
entails a comparative and cross-ventilative 
clarification of the propositions of 
mathematics, natural sciences, social 
sciences, religious sciences, humanities etc. 
Within philosophy, it can have deeply 
disturbing implications. It can provide a 
devastating critique of the entire 
philosophical discourse. The most time-
honored and entrenched metaphysical, 
cosmological, axiological, ideological and 
epistemological claims can be shaken to 
their foundations. By surveying the logical 
geography of philosophical discourse, it can 
question the truth-value of metaphysical, 
ethical, aesthetic, theological and 
ideological statements. Most importantly, it 
can interrogate the truth of theories of 
knowledge and knowledge-claims of 
various disciplines.  
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